

Timing in Cyber-Physical Systems

Marc Weiss, Ph.D.

mweiss@nist.gov

NIST, Time and Frequency Division

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Timing in Cyber-Physical Systems: Outline

- The term Timing used here as a general term: frequency, phase or time sync or source
- Expected massive growth in the Internet of Things (IoT)
- NIST has organized a Public Working Group (PWG)
 - The near-final timing framework for CPS
 - Timing future in CPS: Technology Roadmap
- Among other efforts related to timing in the IoT

GE White Paper

Figure 2. Rise of the Industrial Internet






Figure 5. Industrial Internet Potential GDP Share



Source: World Bank, 2011 and General Electric

M2M World of Connected Services The Internet of Things



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The NIST CPS PWG

- Accelerate progress in cyber-physical systems across all domains.
- Currently lack a unified technical foundation for broad collaboration.
- The CPS-PWG will address this need by developing a shared foundation for progress: a **Framework Document**
- NIST provides a neutral perspective, technical expertise, and convening capability.

Q: When will key milestones be reached?

- June 30, 2014: Kick-off webinar
- August 11-12, 2014: First face-to-face workshop at NIST
- December, 2014: Initial Sub-group reports complete
- March, 2015: Release the integrated framework for public review
- Spring, 2015: Integrated CPS framework complete
- April 7-8, 2015: Second workshop to launch Technology Roadmap effort
- Fall, 2015: Technology Roadmap complete


NIST CPS PWG Subgroups and Framework Document Sections

- Each subgroup has an industry, academia, and NIST co-chair
- Reference Architecture
- Cybersecurity
- Data Integration
- Timing
- Use Cases

CPS PWG Framework Timing Section

- Timing subgroup cochairs
 - Marc Weiss – NIST
 - Hugh Melvin – National University of Ireland, Galway (NUIG)
 - Sundeep Chandhoke, National Instruments (NI)
- Timing Section of Framework
 - Introduction
 - Time-Awareness
 - Timing and Latency
 - Timing Security

Time Awareness: CPS Node and Environment, Currently




- No semantics of accurate time neither in design, nor languages
- Possibly bounded TIs
- Almost never stable (deterministic)
- Hence **robust, correct by construction solutions cannot be done here!**

- Precise TIs
- Can be accurate (traceable to SI second or TAI)
- Hence **robust**, correct by construction is possible (but not very flexible)

This slide based on ones by John Eidson

Time Awareness: CPS Node and Environment Potential Future with Correct by Construction




This slide based on ones by John Eidson

- Time can be specified as abstraction in model
- Code is Bounded and Time explicit
- I/O is Time sensitive, explicit, and precise
- CPU clock is precise and if needed accurate
- Hence **robust, correct by construction solutions can be done here!**

- Precise TIs
- Can be accurate (traceable to SI second or TAI)
- Hence **robust**, correct by construction is possible (but not very flexible)


Timing and Latency: Domains and Multiple Timescales in Time-aware CPSs

Source: Sundeep Chandhoke, National Instruments




CPS Network Manager configuring a CPS

Source: Sundeep Chandhoke, National Instruments



Time-Aware CPS Device Model: Convergence of Best Effort and Time Sensitive Systems

Source: Sundeep Chandhoke, National Instruments



Elements of Secure Timing: assurance

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Source channel assurance | Opportunities to verify that timing information is delivered via an undistorted channel whose expected behavior is well characterized to ensure any deviations can be quickly detected. Distortion of the time-transfer channel may be driven by natural events (e.g. solar weather), unintentional actions (e.g. physically bumping an antenna), or intentional manipulation (e.g. introducing a time delay via spoofing). The data carried by a time-transfer channel may assist in verifying the channel itself. Enablers of channel verification may include unpredictable bits of a digital signature, or a symmetrically encrypted channel. |
| Source data assurance | Verification mechanisms to prove timing data are not forged. These may include digital signatures or symmetrically encrypted packets. |
| User provided assurance | User implemented security to verify unassured timing information. This may include anti-spoof GNSS receiver techniques or additional layers of network security. |

Elements of Secure Timing: resilience

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| Predictable failure | Known CPS failure modes that account for timing denial and other detected timing anomalies. |
| Diversity & Redundancy | Multiple sources and paths of secure time are available to a CPS. Where possible, sources are verified against each other, and in the event of a denial or spoofing attack on one source or other timing anomaly, a mechanism to switch to a redundant source is available. |

Survey of Time Distribution Methods

| | Order of Timing | Source Channel Assurance Provided Today | Source Data Assurance Provided Today | Source Channel Assurance Possible via Enhancement | Source Data Assurance Possible via Enhancement |
|--------------|-----------------|---|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| GPS L1 C/A | nanoseconds | No | No | No | No |
| GPS L2C/L5 | nanoseconds | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Galileo | nanoseconds | No | No | Yes* | Yes* |
| PTP [165] | nanoseconds | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| NTP [166] | milliseconds | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| eLoran [167] | nanoseconds | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| WWVB [168] | microseconds | No | No | Yes | Yes |

*Galileo is not yet a fully operational GNSS constellation, but has indicated strong support for source channel and data assurance via navigation message authentication.

Achieving secure time

- system detects potential timing compromises
- redundant timing source
 - redundancy and diversity of routes to time and frequency sources as well as holdover capabilities of high stability oscillators
- Today: ensure systems can maintain timing within the tolerance of their application for the duration of a timing compromise
- Future: detect compromises early enough that CPS seamlessly function

Next in CPS PWG: Timing Roadmap, Research and Recommendations

- Timing “Correct-by-Construction” techniques
- Convergence of best-effort with time-sensitive systems
 - IT and OT systems
 - How to (or can one?) include cloud and big data systems in RT control
- Timing in Lightweight devices
- Security
 - Predictable failure vs. switchover
 - GPS Spoofing protection
 - PTP security: redundancy, authentication, timing MitM protection

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NSF Call for Proposals 15-541

- Research needed to support systems engineering of high-confidence CPS
- CPS have enormous complexity and variations
 - Size of systems from tiny to global
 - Transience of systems
- Goal: to develop the core system science needed to engineer complex cyber-physical systems which people can depend upon
- <http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2015/nsf15541/nsf15541.htm>



<http://taaccs.org/>

- Face-to-face meetings coming up
 - March 13 immediately after WSTS at Carnegie-Mellon U here in Silicon Valley
 - April 6 immediately before the CPS PWG f2f at NIST, Gaithersburg, MD
- Three current projects
 - WG 110: Seminar on timing APIs, to lead to R&D
 - WG 211: CPS Applications on globally timed platforms
 - WG 212A: Timing support for safety critical systems
- Proposal for NSF call on CPS

The Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC)

- Mission: To accelerate growth of the Industrial Internet by coordinating ecosystem initiatives to connect and integrate objects with people, processes and data using common architectures, interoperability and open standards that lead to transformational business outcomes.
- Open membership, global, nonprofit
- Founded by AT&T, Cisco, GE, IBM and Intel
- Governed by the IIC Steering Committee
 - 10 members
 - 5 permanent seats by Founding companies; 2 members from large enterprise; 1 member from small enterprise; 1 from academia; 1 seat for Executive Director, ex officio
 - Any company can run for an open seat in its category

Thanks for your attention!

Questions?